

**Residency Counts and Housing Rights:  
Conflicting Enactments of Property in Lima's Central Margins**

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**ABSTRACT**

In a shantytown in Lima, who counts as a resident depends on who's counting. Drawing on 21 months of ethnographic fieldwork in a Peruvian "self-help" housing community, I show how censuses and surveys are woven into residency determinations and negotiations over property rights. In these contexts, "residency" is not a self-evident status, but rather a complex performance that involves possessing the right kind of need, participating in development activities, accumulating documents, and being legible to myriad political and personalistic "statelike" entities. Meanwhile, conflicts over inadequate residency performances generate violence, insecurity, and confusion about who "the community" is and who is entitled to represent it. I argue that viewing residency as a contested performance that mediates and remakes longstanding inequalities can improve anthropological interpretations of the sprawling and pockmarked cities of the Global South and the dynamics of urban citizenship that produce them.

## Meaningful Numbers

Apart from some children playing soccer in the empty highways and the occasional passing army truck, the streets to Pachacútec were deserted. It was the day of the 2007 Peruvian national census and President García had issued an “immobility order,” threatening to fine businesses that opened that day and asking conscientious citizens to stay in their houses between 8 am and 6 pm so census-takers could get an accurate count.

The Sunday morning stillness was a stark contrast to the scramble that occurred the night before. People throughout Lima had arrived in droves to take their place in Pachacútec, an impoverished shantytown in Lima’s northwestern periphery founded just 7 years earlier. Meanwhile, many already in Pachacútec were strategically placing family members in different houses, and hastily assembling structures of *esteras* (straw mats) and *maderitas* (prefabricated plywood walls) on empty lots. The census was to be a picture of the population, so they were striking their poses.

For weeks, García’s administration and Peru’s National Institute of Statistics<sup>i</sup> (INEI) had advertised the census as a truth-finding technology that would finally tell Peruvians “How Many We Are, Where We Live, and What We Need.” The controversy over these “facts” began shortly after President García was elected and the results of the 2005 census, conducted under his predecessor, were released. Compared to pre-census projections, the 2005 census appeared to undercount the population by 7% and reported that 18.5% of houses were unoccupied, a number far greater than the 3.8% reported in the *de facto* census of 1993<sup>ii</sup> (Núñez 2006). In an environment where social marginalization and the demand for *casa digna* (dignified housing) dominate political discourse, a census that rendered some people statistically invisible and indicated an abundance of empty houses was incomprehensible and unacceptable. García

promised his administration would take a new census that would see every Peruvian properly. In his view, this meant the population had to stand still for a moment.

As I made rounds with census-takers in Pachacútec, it quickly became clear that people were eager to be counted, albeit in particular places. They sat in otherwise empty houses or sprinted toward doors as census-takers arrived to ensure their name was recorded next to that particular address and that a *vivienda censada* (house censused) sticker was placed on their door. Although INEI officials repeatedly explained that the census had nothing to do with housing rights, most people I spoke with believed the two were related. For Teresa, a 19-year-old census-taker who lived in an overcrowded house in Pachacútec with her mother, child, two older brothers and their wives and children, it seemed logical that the census was intimately connected to property rights. “Why do you think [the INEI] emphasizes the difference between a home and a house,” that is, the group of people who “eat from the same pot” and the structure they inhabit. “The point of this census is to ensure each house has just one home in it. That way houses with many families in them, like mine, can be divided so each family gets their own, and people who already have a house don’t take more than they need.” Another Pachacutano explained that, this time, being counted in Pachacútec would not affect property titles unless individuals had officially changed their residence on their national ID cards. This comment suggested that many more counts had and would occur in Pachacútec and that, in this context of urban marginality and precarious legality, asserting and retaining land rights required appearing as a resident on as many documents as possible.

Between 2007 and 2010, I spent 21 months watching Peruvians move in, out, and around Pachacútec in accordance with the numerous counts conducted by various state-like entities. Although “marginal” shantytowns are conventionally depicted as neglected, unseen, and

undercounted, in Pachacútec official body counts were relatively common and had important political and material consequences. Since the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, people at the margins of Peruvian society, many literally squatting in Lima's periphery, have been central to the construction and legitimacy of the state. Today, governors compete to bring benevolent, technocratic order to these areas, driven by a populist faith that combatting poverty and disorder depends first on counting it properly (Collier 1976; Comaroff and Comaroff 2006). Moreover, in an era of transnational connection and "destatalization of government," numerous other "state-like" entities – including subnational governments, aspiring politicians, NGOs, university students, and the occasional foreign anthropologist – circulate constantly in Pachacútec, counting and categorizing residents in accordance with their own projects and priorities (Trouillot 2001; Goldstein 2004).

Pachacutanos have integrated these powerful but mundane enumerative events into their performances of active residency and understandings of land rights. Although Peruvians believe property rights in the urban margins should be based on a combination of active need and participation in community development projects, they also believe that linking this moral economy to land depends on the repeated, anxiety-producing verifications afforded by bureaucratic and statistical regimes. To analyze how need, participation, and documentation intertwine in Peruvian property regimes, I draw on the local idiom *hacer vivencia*, which translates as "to do living" or "to do residency". This phrase is typically heard only in *pueblos jóvenes* (young towns) like Pachacútec, where people must continually reassert their resident status by contributing to development initiatives, participating in public demonstrations, and making themselves legible to myriad state entities promising land titles, infrastructure and government services. Thus, "hacer vivencia" has a phenomenological quality. It refers both to

performances of residency that include participating in neighborhood meetings, communal work parties, and grassroots social assistance organizations, and to suffering the everyday indignities of shantytown life such as living without running water, choking on dust from unpaved and garbage-strewn streets, and contending with the perpetually damp laundry and wet coughs that result from Pachacútec's cold and humid climate. The divergent ways Pachacutanos enact and interpret "vivencia" demonstrate that "residency" is a multifaceted and morally precarious performance that mediates and remakes longstanding inequalities. These findings reveal instabilities inherent in neoliberal conceptions of property (Blomley 2005) and highlight how variegated geographies of urban inclusion inform the shape and dynamics of urban growth in cities around the world.

Although the concept of "residency" is rarely analyzed in its own right, it nonetheless plays a critical role in social theory and in the everyday lives of shantytown inhabitants. The first two sections of this article emphasize this point by situating residency within anthropological theories of statecraft, marginality and community, and clarifying the moral and material stakes of residency determinations for occupants of Peru's urban periphery. I then examine how Peru's complex urban housing history has generated a composite understanding of residency that, while contextually specific, also reveals contradictions in global efforts to promote rational, (neo)liberal property regimes. From here, I explore the idiom *hacer vivencia*, analyzing how residency is performed through political mobilizing, community building, and the repeated documentary recognitions enabled by censuses and surveys. As women often bear primary responsibility for (re)producing home and community life in Peruvian shantytowns, I elucidate these dynamics by drawing on the stories of five women who "do living" in different ways, highlighting the range of improvisations Peru's urban property regime enables, and its potential

to challenge and remake longstanding inequalities. I conclude by suggesting that viewing residency as a composite and contested performance can improve anthropological understandings of how people relate to space and build communities in 21<sup>st</sup> century cities. Such an understanding provides an important corrective to “marginality,” “social exclusion” and “citizenship” frameworks that obscure the divergent identities and desires of people who occupy the urban periphery, the different ways people use urban space, and the experiential complexity of socio-political inclusion<sup>iii</sup>.

### **Theoretical Framings for Vivencia**

While the concept of “residency” is often taken-for-granted, it is nonetheless integral to how anthropologists theorize relations between populations and the state. Anthropologists have emphasized how efforts to control and render populations legible using censuses and statistics arose concurrently with state schemes to construct “rational” cities, governed by grids that transformed urban areas into “spaces of calculability,” where subjects could be easily located, taxed, counted, conscripted, and policed (Scott 1998; Rose-Redwood and Tanter 2012: 607). The term “residency” encapsulates these efforts to legibly assign people to places, which are central to modern statecraft and democratic politics (Coles 2007). Moreover, as Appadurai (1996) explains, when the “enumerative habit” is applied to residents or property-holders, political representation is tied “not to essentially similar citizens and individuals but to communities conceived as inherently spatial” (129).

These seemingly technocratic practices of mapping and surveying not only help states maintain power; they also constitute “the state” as an ideological and material object. From this vantage, “the state” is simultaneously an incomplete project and a highly consequential abstraction produced through practices of counting and categorizing that divide the population

into observer and observed (Sharma and Gupta 2006). Moreover, where power is fragmented and unsettled, and too many actors compete for the state's role, "the state" is less an entity than a rumor; a veil of uncertainty enveloping practices of counting, documenting, and policing that simultaneously index the promise of order and justice, and the threat of violence and abuse (Aretxaga 2005; Das and Poole 2004). Meanwhile, the "margins of the state" are produced through tentative encounters with state agents, when it is unclear whether a person or practice will help or harm, and individuals find themselves suspended in the precarious space between "threat and guarantee" (Poole 2004). While Latin American cities are infamous for the dramatic ways social inequality is inscribed in the urban landscape (cf. Caldeira 2000; Fischer, McCann, and Auyero 2014), the dynamics of residency determinations in Pachacútec illustrate the importance of embodied and experiential models of marginality that disaggregate the periphery, and illuminate how inhabitants differently experience "the state" depending on their social, political, and official documentary networks, which both materialize and complicate class relations in this context.

Critically, theorists of spatial governmentality have shown that, even in the spatial margins, subjectivities and aspirations are forged in conversation with the uneven presence of "the state". Moreover, in pursuing state-sanctioned ideals of "dignified" life – which in Peru means occupying a single-family home in a cohesive neighborhood equipped with modern infrastructural amenities – people actively engage the state, appropriating or redirecting its techniques to secure livelihoods and advance potentially subversive political agendas (Anderson 2007; Holston 2008). For instance, some squatter organizations may strive to retain control over their communities by taking their own statistics, undermining the authority of official state entities through "governmentality from below" even if, as is often the case in Latin America,

leadership in these organizations is contested and different community factions conjure different counts (Appadurai 2001; Lazar 2008). Likewise, shantytown residents are often aware that how outsiders perceive them has profound material consequences and work to represent themselves in ways that attract state assistance while keeping the threatening aspects of the state at bay (Goldstein 2004). In urban peripheries like Pachacútec, censuses and surveys thus become sites where people perform and negotiate their own perceptions of local realities with the legibility demands of state entities (ibid).

These tactical and anxious engagements with “the state” generate numbers that function as capricious socio-political products that both “are relations” and “have relations” (Verran 2010; Ballesteros 2012). For example, Peruvian population counts are embedded in ideals of democratic modernity and populist promises that a “scientific politics” will benefit those at the margins (Merry 2011; Haya de la Torre 2005), embody relations between political entities and recognized constituents, and have active social lives as fodder for political debate and justification for action. Understanding the diverse effects of numbers requires investigating how experts and laypersons “participate in number” and what happens when people take “numbers into their own heads and hands” (Day et al 2014: 124; Guyer et al 2010:36). Analyzing residency counts in urban Peru advances this intellectual project by demonstrating how numbers, produced with populist and clientelist aims, are woven into Peruvians’ livelihood strategies and battles for land rights.

For decades, scholars have depicted the appropriation of urban land by the “popular classes” as a challenge to entrenched inequalities and a powerful claim to inclusion in modernity and state projects (Matos Mar 1984; Golte and Adams 1989; Dietz 1998). This work has insightfully analyzed the use-value of informality for squatters, politicians, and brokers (Fischer,

McCann, and Auyero 2014), the pragmatic and morally-charged mix of radical and clientelist politics that squatters use to make claims on the state (Stokes 1995; Lazar 2008), and how redeploying hegemonic ideologies of citizenship, propriety and family advances squatters' land claims while reproducing forms of inequality and precarity (Holston 2008; Murphy 2015). Nonetheless, it is still surprisingly common for commentators to draw on languages of marginality, exclusion and citizenship to portray squatters as a cohesive group, united by their collective sociopolitical exclusion and the precariousness of their land claims. Evidence from Pachacútec, however, emphasizes the heterogeneity of squatters, not only because the race and class divides that characterize Peru are also evident within shantytowns, but also because of the complexities of shantytown property regimes. Squatters claim land in various and conflicting ways, at multiple times, and for distinct but overlapping audiences, creating questions for would-be residents regarding who "the community" is and who is entitled to represent it.

Latin Americanists have long argued that "community" does not describe a "static, place-based social collective" but a "power-laden field of social relations whose meanings, structures, and frontiers are continually produced, contested and reworked in relation to a complex range of sociopolitical attachments and antagonisms" (Gregory 1998:11 cited in Goldstein 2004: 96). In Peruvian shantytowns, communities are created as residents collaborate to build roads and schools, procure water and electricity, organize political rallies, and strategically represent themselves to state agents who anticipate particular forms of community and inscribe them into documents and registries. These activities forge intertwining networks of affective, economic, political, and documentary support that are connected to land, but not contained by it (Lobo 1982; Allen 2002). This leads to conflicting visions, versions, and experiences of community, and related disagreements over property rights.

Conflicts over residency and property rights in Pachacútec demonstrate that property is fundamentally relational, signifying a broad social agreement about the “bundle of rights” one holds against others and one’s obligations toward them. Moreover, the rules we make about property in land (e.g. who has rights to land, how land may be used, how much may be accumulated, how long rights last) engage deeply moral questions about the kind of society we want to create (Blomley 2003:122). Whatever rules we choose, “property” – like “community” – is not a static object, but requires a “continual, active doing” through various performances, communicative claims, and material enactments. The complexities of this “doing” reveal fissures, contradictions and inconsistencies in neoliberal and neopopulist<sup>iv</sup> models of property, and generate practices that complicate and compromise these dominant orders even as they reproduce them (135).

The government counts that occur regularly in Peru’s urban margins rely on and reproduce a concept of residency as a composite ideal that encompasses many disparate elements. These include being present in the area full-time, participating in community development initiatives, having nowhere else to go, and using the land to create “dignified” single-family homes. However, acts of surveying and censusing effectively disaggregate this ideal and allow for multiple and conflicting performances of residency. These counts leave behind documents, the material remainders of official inscriptions (Ballesteros 2012), which Peruvians then integrate into their residency performances. Ironically, repeated efforts to update government registries and make residency legible effectively destabilize “residency” as a governmental category. In this context, residency counts have complex and contradictory effects, generating anxiety and insecurity among some residents, while allowing others to strategize and

prosper. I illustrate the relationship between residential anxiety, recounts, and large numbers in the next section.

### **Situating Pachacútec & the Vivencia Paradox**

A local ombudsmen once told me, “if there’s anything we know for certain, it’s that Pachacútec is BIG.” By most accounts she was right. Visually, Pachacútec is startling. Rows upon rows of houses stretch from desert mountains to the ocean. Numbers seem to confirm this visual immensity. According to government reports following the 2007 census, Pachacútec houses 180,000 residents – though this number appears to grow as it circulates. Because governments assess poverty based largely on spatial indicators, numbers also affirm the area’s identity as a homogenous “extreme poverty zone”. 84% of homes are made of precarious materials that offer little protection against Pachacútec’s notoriously harsh climate, where winter fog is so thick it forms rivers in the streets. 97% of households lack piped water and sewage systems, leading to widespread infectious and respiratory diseases (Consortio Ingenieros 2009). One survey reported that children in Pachacútec suffer an average of 12 infections per year (Uruchi et al 2006). [FIGURE 1]

These statistics, combined with mediated images of ramshackle houses, rolling fog, ragged children, and masses of people demanding water and roads, help generate Pachacútec’s public image as an overcrowded site of extreme poverty that rightly demands urgent attention from the various governments and NGOs operating in the area. Like other districts in Peru, Pachacútec falls under the jurisdiction of four different governing bodies: the district of Ventanilla, the province of Callao, the region of Callao, and the national government of Peru. As such, there are four different governments Pachacutanos may make claims on, and four different

political administrations pandering for residents' votes in an area where presumed population density make this an especially good investment of political attention.

In the quest for political legitimacy, politicians compete to be seen as active on behalf of the poor, such that Pachacútec's "impoverished masses" become a precious political commodity. Eager to transform atomized individuals into loyal constituents as cheaply as possible, neopopulist governors spend much of their political energy counting, or otherwise "recognizing" residents as legitimate community members, eligible for the state's limited social assistance programs<sup>vi</sup>. In this effort, they both ally with local *dirigentes* (community leaders) who take special initiative when it comes to area development, and hire enterprising residents with large social networks to work as political promoters. These "promoter" positions are highly prized and among the only formal jobs locally available to residents. Donning colored vests that represent different levels of government, promoters arrive at doors daily: taking surveys, registering residents, and promising that their political patron understands the community's problems and is committed to resolving them. Surveys thus help construct political networks, and officially recognizing and registering impoverished "communities" helps build political constituencies. Likewise, the imagined divisions between "political" and "community" spheres, and between public servants and self-interested citizens, disappear in the bodies of neighbors who represent both (Auyero 2001; Poole 2004). Residents must therefore be careful about how they present themselves to neighbors, since it is never entirely clear how individuals and social networks will align with different political entities and the shifting identity of the state.

Despite Pachacútec's image as a densely populated "extreme poverty zone" and its corresponding political value, closer inspection of the area reveals a paradox. In a place widely represented as housing Lima's impoverished masses, many of the houses are empty. The words

“No Vive” are scrawled on doors in large letters, and where they are not, neighbors eagerly tell outside observers whether the house is truly inhabited, or if the supposed resident “no vive, no hace vivencia” [does not live here, does not ‘do living’ here]. Indeed, several interlocutors described Pachacútec as a *pueblo fantasma*, a ghost town only vaguely populated by formal shadows. [FIGURE 2]

In addition to “empty” houses with the words “No Vive” on them, Pachacútec is frequently speckled with smoldering ashes – evidence that a *desalojo* (eviction) occurred the night before. Neighbors offer divergent explanations for these events. Some say the house was occupied by a *turista* (tourist) or “un vivo que no hacia vivencia” [a deceitful person who did not do living]. Others say evictions are carried out by “bad community leaders” who incite neighbors to violence so they can “traffic” in stolen land<sup>vii</sup>. Still others hold both views simultaneously, revealing a moral economy in which multiple moral logics compete and intersect, informing a powerful, if ambivalent, sense of justice that shapes the dynamics, interpretations, and outcomes of land disputes (Fassin 2012; Thompson 1971). The high stakes and complex moralities of residency determinations result from a convoluted political-legal history that informs popular expectations about what shantytowns should be and who should inhabit them.

### **The Historical Construction of Multi-Valent Vivencia**

The relationship between residency and land rights in urban Peru can be traced to the 1950s when rural migrants began flooding into Lima. The simplest narratives argue that this “overflow” of the popular masses overwhelmed policy-makers, forcing them to leave urban development in the hands of migrants themselves and creating a city where governance and infrastructure are constantly catching up with urban growth (Riofrio 1996; Collier 1976).

However, these descriptions too often overlook how “the state”, in various guises, has been complicit in these developments, structuring the economic, ideological, legal, and political environment in which squatters seek land rights, as well as the performances necessary to obtain them.

To begin, the mid-century migration streams that triggered battles over urban land were the result of “elite land grabs” in the countryside and the development of extractive export industries that disrupted rural livelihoods and provided few jobs to compensate (Fitzgerald 1979). By the 1980s, poverty, inequality, and political disaffection spurred the rise of the Maoist guerrilla insurgency Shining Path and whole villages moved to Lima, fleeing the violence of a war that disproportionately affected indigenous peoples long considered “alien to modernity” (Franco 2006). The increasing visibility of informal settlements in Lima’s periphery – commonly called “invasions” to index their extralegal origins and the apparent foreignness of settlers – prompted anxiety among urban elites (Collier 1976). The presence of Andean migrants in Lima challenged both the ordering capacities of the state and conventional geographies of race in Peru. As “matter out of place,” many Limeños viewed migrant shantytowns as sites of delinquency and social breakdown, a perspective shared by conventional academic wisdom at the time (Weismantel 2001; Lobo 1982).

To gain legitimacy for their land claims, squatters had to counter these damning portrayals, such that battles over urban land were partly discursive and ideological. Staying within official moral frameworks, squatters combined liberal ideals of autonomy and entrepreneurship with conservative family values to contend that they were poor but upstanding individuals who, absent government support, were struggling to provide dignified lives for their families. Scholars and politicians from the left and right rallied around this framing, arguing that

squatters were “mainly interested in consolidating their housing investments, getting their kids into school, and identifying themselves as respectable property owners” (Mangin and Turner 1968:155; Murphy 2015). The fact that women, who were normatively linked to the moral space of the home and principally responsible for its maintenance (Boesten 2010; Blondet 2002), were often primary protagonists in land invasions helped evidence these virtuous intentions. Reframed as “progressive” or “self-help” housing, informal settlements were no longer opposed to the formal suburbs, but could be viewed as proto-urbanizations that with time, labor, and the proper political-legal tools, could be transformed into modern neighborhoods, occupied by dignified, propertied citizens (Anderson 2007; Fernandez-Maldonado 2007).

Although marginal settlements continue to be viewed with marked ambivalence, over time, Peruvian politicians developed innovative ways to demonstrate a politically advantageous compassion for the poor while apparently preventing the disorder of the margins from engulfing the city. In 1961, Congress passed Law 13517 on Marginal Settlements, which officially prohibited land invasions while also creating rules under which invasions could be successful. For instance, one law gave local authorities only 24 hours to forcibly evict settlers, after which squatters had some legal claim to the land and the conflict became a “judicial process of arbitration and negotiation”<sup>viii</sup> (Dosh and Lerager 2006: 39). If invasions survived these violent beginnings and subsequent judicial negotiations, Congress promised to help “organized citizens” create “modern” and “dignified” neighborhoods by installing infrastructure and legalizing individual land claims. By 1968, however, the national government realized it could not keep pace with these obligations and Congress decoupled physical and legal land regularization. This created a pattern where illegal physical occupation was followed by legal recognition, with infrastructure eventually being installed after the fact (Fernandez-Maldonado 2007).

The imbrication of formality and informality within Peruvian housing law has helped to normalize “invasions” as a form of “self-help” housing. Absent stable employment or affordable formal housing, invasions became a reasonable way for migrants, impoverished Limeños, and young couples to acquire homes of their own. However, obtaining housing this way also demands the performance of a particularly spectacular poverty that forces would-be residents outside the law. The components of this performance are so well established that one scholar described it as the “Recipe for a House” in Peru (Torribio 2005). That said, as it is enacted, this violent and anxiety-provoking invasion formula can also be understood as a morally precarious numbers game, the outcome of which depends on controlling when and how settlers are seen by authorities.

First, neighbors organize a simultaneous overnight arrival on vacant land. While the sheer number of squatters arriving en masse makes it difficult for authorities to remove them by force, gaining legitimacy for their claims requires more nuanced techniques. Upon arriving, squatters must immediately begin performing residency: erecting provisional shelters on the site, soliciting the support of local governors<sup>ix</sup>, and publicly portraying themselves as members of the righteous impoverished struggling to provide dignified homes for their families. Meanwhile, to retain political legitimacy, governors must be seen “seeing” settlers as they “truly” are: either greedy invaders wreaking havoc on a peaceful social system, or masses of poor but deserving citizens.

The moral and legal ambivalence of squatting was compounded by a rhetorical ambiguity regarding the nature of property; that is, whether property rights were based on active use and necessity or a product of official ownership and on-paper possession. In 1969, new Peruvian land reform policies promised land would begin to serve a “social function in a new system of justice” and rightfully belonged to “those who work it” rather than those who “charge rent without

tilling” (Velasco 2005 [1968]: 282). This sentiment was written into the 1979 constitution and has become an important part of Peru’s moral economy of property. Nonetheless, the final affirmation that land claims were legitimate was the delivery of legal land titles – paper fetishes that materialize a relationship of legal recognition between the state and the titleholder (Gordillo 2006).

Throughout Peru’s urban housing history, politicians at different levels of government have competed for the right to distribute land titles. As Gilbert (2002) explains, titling programs “constitute housing policy on the cheap...[They are] an apparently unchallengeable recipe for popularity with ordinary people [that] governments have been anxious to pursue.” Because of these political battles, between 1961 and 2002 the administrative responsibility for titling lands shifted between national and local governments four times and the particular government office responsible changed 13 times (Calderón 2002). Today, whether titling powers lie with national, regional, provincial, or district governments depends on the specific legal history of the settlement. Moreover, the specific requirements for obtaining these titles vary depending on how this legal history aligns with the particular circumstances of property acquisition. The only constant in this legal morass is that obtaining official title requires demonstrating continued occupation over time. As such, shantytown occupants do the most logical thing—continually accumulate documentary proof of residency from as many organizations as possible.

In the 1990s, President Fujimori attempted to streamline titling processes, temporarily cloaking clientelist titling practices in neoliberal ideologies. Around the time of Fujimori’s first election, right-wing economist and Peruvian neoliberal ideologue Hernando de Soto was receiving worldwide attention for his assertion that legal land titles could eliminate poverty in the Third World. He argued that formalizing the poor’s property claims would give them access to

capital and credit, enable entrepreneurship, and thus alleviate both individual and national poverty through a kind of “popular capitalism” (Calderón 2002). In 1996, as Peru’s social programs were being slashed and state assets privatized to repay national debts, Fujimori received a loan from the World Bank to follow de Soto’s recommendations and create the Commission to Formalize Informal Property (COFOPRI). Between 1996 and 2009, COFOPRI issued approximately 1.8 million urban land titles (Fernandez-Maldonado and Bredenoord 2010). At least 10,500 of these were distributed in Pachacútec (Consortio Ingenieros 2009). Over time, these titles, which ostensibly represented a supreme form of property recognition, have intersected in uneasy ways with the recognition of neighbors and local authorities, rendering the conflict between property as function and property as product and on-paper possession especially acute.

### **Local & Living Histories**

Pachacútec occupies a special place in Lima’s history of urban development. It is one of three “planned *barriadas*” in which the national government appropriated and sought to reproduce squatters’ “self-help” housing solutions by relocating politically problematic invasions to parceled but otherwise barren land in the periphery and helping squatters organize the “grassroots” community development initiatives that invasions were known for (Collier 1976). The first “planned *barriada*” was created in 1971 when, following a violent and widely publicized invasion of private lands, President Velasco relocated settlers to vacant land that he promised to develop into the “model city” Villa el Salvador (VES). This model was repeated in 1984 and then again in 2000 with the founding of Pachacútec (Fernandez-Maldonado and Bredenoord 2010).

The official story of Pachacútec begins in 1988 when President García<sup>x</sup> founded a self-help housing project called The Special Project City Pachacútec and sold the land to impoverished citizens for a nominal fee. Due to infrastructure delays, the area remained relatively uninhabited until February 3rd of 2000, when President Fujimori relocated 25,000 people from an invasion in VES to what is now called the Pilot Project New Pachacútec, or simply “El Piloto”.

However, in the historical memory of community members, Fujimori’s administration planned the VES invasion specifically to incite a conflict that Fujimori could resolve, bolstering his image as a leader firm enough to bring order to disorder, and beneficent enough to provide land to Lima’s neediest families. Amélie, a resident relocated from VES in 2000, knew the invasion was politically motivated but nonetheless took advantage of the opportunity to create a more dignified life for her family.

“The Villa El Salvador invasion was huge. But that was planned... it was something political, because they came house by house by house registering people to invade... My dad said this was political...that we would get in trouble...But my mother said, ‘We can’t live our lives clustered like pigs. Our daughters need to go out on their own. If there’s an opportunity, it costs us nothing to investigate’...And it was political...because who is going... to just give us land?”

With the 2000 elections rapidly approaching, Fujimori endeavored to make the relocation as smooth as possible. The military provided food and water daily and settlers assembled esteras in accordance with the tentative maps of urban planners. Fujimori’s administration further

promised that land titles would be granted quickly and that infrastructure for electricity, water and sewage were imminent. Not coincidentally, the relocation received enormous media attention. The promise of free land in a rapidly developing area prompted many to join the invasion in VES or to settle directly in the relocation site. Thus, although Pachacútec is often described as a site of *pura migrantes* (pure migrants), over half of recent “migrants” come from metropolitan Lima-Callao, and only 24% come from mountain and jungle regions conventionally associated with rural poverty<sup>xi</sup>.

The rapid influx of residents disrupted Fujimori’s original, orderly, top-down development plans. By 2007, although most original Pilot Project residents had received land titles, only a few neighborhoods had paved roads and electric connections. Moreover, large-scale water and sewage infrastructure was perpetually delayed because Pachacútec’s foundational dynamics were still in play. The area continued to attract people in need of cheap housing and experienced “growth spurts” every time a politician announced a development initiative, promised to rezone land for housing, or sent surveyors to register residents for a social assistance program. Different versions of land titles, called *constancias de posesión* (certificates of possession), are distributed by various politicians and community leaders and the installation of water and sewage infrastructure remains imminent.

Urban housing experts have long argued that land titles promote community development by providing security of tenure and encouraging individual investment (Lloyd 1980). However evidence from Pachacútec supports more recent research that suggests easy access to land titles may delay development in “self-help” housing communities, where people must contribute time and labor to build their neighborhoods from scratch (see Dosh and Lerager 2006). As Appadurai (1996) explains, land titles create “semiotically fracturable” entities. They bind land, person and

paper together in ways that can be strategically split, allowing land to serve as a home, a commodity, or a site of future plans and economic security. Land titles both tie people to land and liberate them from it, partially unyoking people and property from the complex local structures of accountability in which they would otherwise be embedded (ibid). Within Pachacútec, these partially unyoked individuals are called *turistas* (tourists). The controversies surrounding them illuminate Pachacutanos' ideals of residency, the various ways this ideal-type residency may be strategically disaggregated, and the relationship between residency determinations and the dynamics of social exclusion in Peru's urban margins.

### **Shantytown “Tourists” & Vivencia Controversies**

In the world imagined by Peruvian officials when they design housing policies, “living” in a shantytown implies numerous things: “truly needing” land to provide a family with “dignified” housing conditions, residing full time, suffering area discomforts, participating in community development projects, and eventually owning the land they occupy. Yet in practice, these traits do not always align. One may contribute to community development while living elsewhere; participate in local projects while having multiple houses; stay in a house all day and not participate; or “truly need” a house yet never be home. Falling short in any single aspect of vivencia however, can lead to being labeled a “turista” and put one at risk of being evicted by neighbors or the state agents they enlist.

All my interlocutors agreed that turistas were problematic, but disagreed about how this term should be applied in practice. Local government reports describe turistas as people “who began to trade in property or opted to convert their property into non-permanent housing... They do not reside in Pachacútec but keep their lots occupied in one form or another or visit them on occasion” (Paytán and Villalobos 2005). A local schoolteacher, meanwhile, suggested that

anyone working outside Pachacútec qualified as a turista. For her, Pachacútec contained two types of residents,

“There are the people who live and work in the community...then there’s the other 70% that works far away... That’s why they’re called turistas. They live here, but you don’t see them. They arrive home exhausted so they’re disinterested in the community...As a result there are people who get angry, who bring justice.”

“Justice” in this case meant punishing an individual’s apparent indifference to community development by burning their house and replacing them with a more participatory and productive resident closer to the ideal “self-help” housing recipient.

Others were more sympathetic to people who, in pursuing dignified lives for their families, split their time between communities of work and rest. According to Pilar,

“There are many people who work really far away. You can’t come from one end of the city to the other [every day] ... The ones that we don’t know, to those problems we say, “Oh they need to move, they don’t really need the house.” But that’s not the way it is. In practice, we’re very selfish because everyone has a right to have a piece of land for themselves, no?”

While Pilar admitted that not all types of vivencia were equal – “it’s not like us who are here, suffering all of the inclemency of the environment, of the cold” – she maintained that transient residents who had no other option to own a single family home still “lived” in Pachacútec because “this is where they have their land.”

Pilar was not alone in this opinion. During the 2007 census, a fight broke out between a woman and a census-taker who refused to count her in an all but empty lot. Neighbors took the woman’s side: “That is where she will put her house, so you should count her there.” Eventually

the census-taker agreed to record the house as “under-construction” and neighbors watched as the surveyor placed a “house-censused” sticker on the few standing esteras.

Together, Pilar’s statement and the census incident suggest that *vivencia* is less about occupancy than it is about attracting the support and sympathies of neighbors, raising questions about the circumstances in which a person is accused of not “doing living”. Indeed, there are some occasions when neighbors develop unfavorable opinions of precisely those residents who seem most in need of a home.

Teodora, for instance, lived in a straw shack in a recent invasion high on Pachacútec’s sandy hillside. She had migrated from the Amazon a year earlier and worked as a cook in the local *beneficencia*, a government run dining hall devoted to serving only the poorest of the poor. In exchange for working from 6:30 am to 4:30 pm she received food for herself and her two children, but no monetary compensation. Adding to her troubles, the dirigentes in Teodora’s settlement were threatening to evict her because she was so rarely at home. “They think I have another house because I’m not at home. But I don’t have another house. The reason I’m not home is because I’m here at the dining hall working.” To counter these “no vive” accusations, Teodora sat in her dilapidated home for 48 hours to prove she did indeed live there. It was the only time I saw her miss work.

Teodora was accused of being a “turista” not despite her apparent need, but rather because of it. As a single mother and recent migrant of obvious indigenous extraction, Teodora suffered from overlapping socio-political exclusions (Altamirano et al 2004), filtered through the local framework of “*vivencia*.” Although her categorical and ‘legible’ social marginality made her eligible for state resources and sympathetic enough that local leaders initially supported her land claim, her limited social network and lack of local knowledge caused her to fall short in two

key aspects of vivencia: community participation and documentary acquisition. While “participation” and “documents” in some ways represent conflicting ideologies of property as function and property as object, both can be understood as ways Pachacutanos incorporate counts – punctuated moments of political visibility – into their performances of residency.

### **Participatory Vivencia & the Art of Counting Extra**

Many Pachacutanos had previously lived in one of Lima’s “formal” neighborhoods, either as children, renters, or guests of relatives, and described “the reality” of Pachacútec as utterly distinct from what they had known before. In “formal” neighborhoods, they paid rent and worked independent jobs hoping to save money and improve their circumstances. In Pachacútec, however, getting ahead required attending meetings, filing documents, and organizing work parties. Participation is a particularly powerful requirement for occupants of “self-help” housing settlements that distinguishes these areas from “formal” suburbs and defines the rhythm of everyday life in these spaces (Lloyd 1980).

One of the most demanding forms of participation in Pachacútec was simply “being there.” When dirigentes and municipal employees told me that to accomplish things in Pachacútec “tienes que estar allí” [you have to be there] they meant it was important to be wherever would make them most politically visible until they got what they needed. This meant confronting bureaucrats and “following documents” for hours on end, or dropping everything at a moment’s notice to attend an information session, registration campaign, or impromptu political rally. During my first three months in Pachacútec, I attended seven rallies held by five different politicians, and missed many more. These rallies were opportunities for Pachacutanos to make themselves visible to politicians as unified communities, capable of substantial political pressure or support. Politicians, meanwhile, would be seen seeing these constituents:

acknowledging their existence, lending credibility to their land claims, and publicly demonstrating their compassion for the visibly impoverished. Given the frequency and spontaneity of these events, “being there” involved more than mere physical presence. It implied an anxious and active awaiting; a constant readiness to be seen by the state as a faceless member of the easily politicized masses, a virtuous citizen actively promoting urban development, or a legible tick-mark on a registry.

Pachacutanos’ emphasis on the participation component of *vivencia* made it possible for individuals to qualify as community members without meeting other criteria such as full time residency or dire necessity. Silvia occupied land in two different settlements in Pachacútec. When I inquired how she managed to “hacer *vivencia*” in two places at once, she explained what real *vivencia* was.

“*Vivencia* is not just to live there, to be stuck in your house day and night. Living also means to collaborate, participate in a meeting, to give your input. When there’s a chore to do, you go out and do the chore. When it’s necessary to protest, you go out and protest, and you work hand in hand with the *dirigentes*... That’s what living is for me... Whether or not you’re in your house 24 hours a day, you have to be there (*tienes que estar allí*)”

Claudia offers another striking example of participatory *vivencia* and how people may exploit multivalent understandings of residency. Claudia and her husband built a house and restaurant in one of Pachacútec’s newest settlements. However they also owned a house in a wealthy suburb, a summer home in a rural resort town, and a wholesale pasta business. Her four sisters ostensibly occupied adjacent houses on her block and Claudia claimed yet another lot for

her adult son. While Claudia would never qualify as someone who “truly needed” land, she had the support of neighbors and was pushing the settlement to develop infrastructure. Overall, she performed residency quite well.

Although participation gives impoverished individuals opportunities to obtain land, these examples illustrate that participation has no necessary relationship to immediate need. As active participants in community development initiatives who know how and when to make themselves politically visible, Silvia and Claudia have mastered the art of counting extra as they perform residency for neighbors, state agents, and political figures. A similar but more socially and morally precarious art may be practiced using documents.

### **Taking Pictures: The Ambivalence of Documentary Vivencia**

One of the most critical, and problematic, components of vivencia is the active accumulation of documents. When governments and other “state-like” entities count squatters to demonstrate their technocratic competence and concern for the poor, they construct registries – their own official pictures of the population – and leave behind documents. Documents are the material remainders of counts, which Pachacutanos use to prove they have been “officially” recognized as residents by different organizations (Ballesteros 2012). In this context, documents are powerful objects, potentially capable of keeping angry neighbors and property usurpers at bay. Yet documents are also loathed for the distance they create between reality and representation and feared for their ability to destabilize the property rights people had previously earned (Hull 2012).

While anthropologists have critiqued statistics and documents as technologies of state control, they have also argued that *not* counting and *not* providing official documents can be extreme forms of political and epistemological violence (Scheper-Hughes 1992). In Latin

America, histories of colonialism and racial inequality have created a situation in which documents are associated with whiteness, privilege, and social inclusion, while *not* having documents leaves one vulnerable to violence and state predation (Weismantel 2001). As Gordillo (2006) explains, for the historically excluded, state documents are fetishes that keep alive a connection between the documented entity and the state, providing tangible proof of that entity's existence within the state, and its right to be protected by it and from it.

Pachacutanos described the importance of myriad “official” recognitions using idioms of existence. A local childcare worker explained that birth certificates and child identity cards were valuable because “leaving a child without a document...makes the child like an animal. The child would be a zero that isn't worth anything because he doesn't have any document.” Likewise, one woman was outraged that the 2007 census had not counted her mother while she was travelling. “It's really bad. It's as if she didn't exist in this country.” This valorization of documentary recognition extended to property. Interlocutors often described land titles as “birth certificates for the house,” objects that brought land into existence for the state and transformed the titleholder into a special type of social person, officially linked to land and ideologically associated with civic virtue.

In community meetings, speakers frequently mentioned that “the reality” of Pachacútec had changed over time. While it was once full of *reubicados e invasores* (relocated persons and invaders) it was now largely occupied by *propietarios* (property owners) who had a special relationship to land and the state. For this reason, one very active community member declined a nomination to serve as a dirigente, explaining “I would love to do the job, but I'm not, as they say, a titleholder...So, it depends on you all. I am not a title-holder. I don't exist.”

Although many Pachacutanos were proud of their status as property owners, others believed that easy access to land titles had contributed to the lack of full-time area residents. As the head of a popular dining hall explained,

“It was a mistake to give property titles to those people...Once they got them, they left. Here we have many empty lots...Some people sold them but a few, because they have titles, don’t even have esteras. And since they have land titles, other people can’t move in there. If they did, the owner would come and give them problems, so you can’t do it.”

Officially, land titles are valued for communicating lived property relations to state actors, allowing these relations to do social work in expanded spheres of interaction (De Soto 1989; Poole 2004; Hull 2012). However, documents also reveal and widen the distances between official and lived social realities, enabling some to perform residency on paper and in state registries even when they are not “doing living” in the eyes of community members.

Amélie spoke at length about the problems caused by the lack of vivencia in her neighborhood.

“People left and now there are many abandoned properties... Because many people don’t live here, we can’t ask for things [from authorities]...Also at one time delinquents moved into those empty lands and it was dangerous... There were rapes...robberies... Vivencia is important because we help each other. But look here, on this side I have my neighbor that doesn’t live here. My sister [who owns land uphill] also doesn’t live here.”

Given the multidimensional nature of vivencia, the degree to which necessity confers land rights, and the problems that arise when houses stay empty, reverence for written documents

did not go unchallenged. Although Pachacútec's governance statute stated dirigentes had to be titleholders, many residents believed titleholders were detached from Pachacútec's reality, while many of the most active dirigentes did not have land titles. This situation was an artifact of how the temporality of community contributions and documentary recognition aligned with peoples' shifting needs and land use practices. Following the relocation, some settlers worked with national government agencies and NGOs to bring development programs to Pachacútec, and were officially recognized by these institutions as community representatives. Yet after these settlers received land titles, many returned to other homes in central Lima while continuing to "represent the community" in institutional negotiations. This angered other would-be dirigentes eager to work with local governments to install infrastructure, pave roads, and ensure that "active" residents received land titles. They therefore used other indicators of vivencia such as duration of residence, the size of one's local social network, or being in the process of property formalization and documentary accumulation, to determine whether one could be a dirigente. Titling lands had indeed changed "the reality" of Pachacútec. But it did so by raising crucial questions about who "the community" was and who was entitled to represent it.

Due to these complexities, land titles are highly prized but do not necessarily ensure security of tenure. Many of my interlocutors feared that if they dropped their guard, someone could use a recount to undo their land claim. For instance, Luisa bought land in Pachacútec in 1988 when President García first founded the settlement. However, because the area was uninhabited and undeveloped, she procured a house in another shantytown while retaining legal title to land in Pachacútec. For Luisa, the land was an important financial and relational resource; something she could lend to kin, sell in hard times, or reoccupy if she lost rights to her primary residence. When the 2000 relocation brought life to Pachacútec, Luisa began staying in the house

twice a week to ensure new community leaders would see her living there and would not sell the land out from under her. As she explained,

“If you live in a house, you’re the new owner... The titleholder can’t just kick you out... Because the owner... as much as he’s the owner, hasn’t taken possession... The person who has more right is the person who lives there... If you live in a house, even if it has a legal owner, you become the rightful owner of the house.”

Other interlocutors affirmed Luisa’s assertion that possession and community consensus had more weight than legal title. One of her neighbors explained that when the original inhabitants left their lots empty, dirigentes called a meeting to decide whether to accept new occupants.

“And that’s what we did... There were some altercations with owners... but if the owner wasn’t going to live there, well...”

Although Pachacutanos recognize that documents do not always represent reality, they nonetheless believe that they should, and take measures to rectify the disconnect. During my fieldwork, many community leaders were demanding the state expropriate land from previous owners and redistribute it to people actively “doing living” in Pachacútec. Others exploited recurrent counts (e.g. tax registries, censuses, health surveys, activity sign-ups) to build a paper trail that could challenge a previous owner’s claims, thus realigning official and lived realities. Local dirigentes also tried, and occasionally succeeded, in overriding previous recognitions by replicating state practices: constructing their own registries and producing alternative *constancias de posesión*. They used paper trails and recounts to make the real world align with their ideals of what property-making and state oversight should be. However, efforts to invoke the power and reproduce the “signature of the state” in various documents undermined both the

legibility of the state and the force of documents produced in its name (Das 2007). In this environment, many official recognitions might be necessary to ensure security of tenure and no single authorization was ever sufficient. Thus, every recount, every effort to link names to places on paper, forces people to reaffirm the state's image of them as residents, while providing others opportunities to refashion that image.

### **Striking Poses: 'Doing Living' for the State**

Amélie spoke at length about the number of times she had to re-register her land claim during her first few years in Pachacútec. She explained that if COFOPRI surveyors knocked and did not find her at home, they would give her land to another family. She said many people in Pachacútec lost land this way, regardless of whether COFOPRI had already registered them. Although Amélie disliked being trapped in her house for days waiting to be counted, she believed recounts were necessary.

“COFOPRI at that time saw many lots were *en blanco* (blank; empty)... It shouldn't be en blanco... Someone should be living there. It's the same as the dining hall. Some of us [are registered food recipients and] have our number but other people are just there temporarily because they need food and another woman, one with a number, doesn't collect her ration...[The authorities] don't let you keep the number if you don't take advantage of it...It's the same with land.

Amélie's use of the term “en blanco” highlights the ideal relation between real-world conditions and documentary imaginaries. “En blanco” is used to refer to the ontological condition of the lot, which Amélie argues should lead to the erasure of the aspiring titleholder in the COFOPRI

registry and their replacement with a new resident. Amélie both conflates real and documentary worlds and suggests they should be mutually determining. Moreover, by comparing the distribution of land to dining hall rations, she suggests that “need” is determined by active use. The dining hall Amélie referred to, the same one that employed Teodora, was committed to serving only the “neediest” Pachacutanos. Administrators believed keeping pace with the neediest required reassessment every six months to ensure recipients were still poor and, relatedly, still actively using the resource. Each reassessment meant surprise home visits, new forms to file, and new boxes to check. As Amélie explained, it’s the same with land. After initial COFOPRI surveillance stopped, area politicians began conducting their own counts that, either explicitly or incidentally, assessed who was really “doing living” in Pachacútec. Retaining land rights thus requires incorporating repeated documentary recognitions into everyday performances of residency.

Although Amélie believed the lack of productive residents was a serious problem in Pachacútec, she nonetheless ensured that her neighbors and relatives didn’t come up “en blanco” on surveys. When surveyors arrived she ran from house to house, showing them the identity documents of presumptive residents and explaining why they were not present at that moment. Amélie was effectively “doing living” for everyone on her block. This was a common strategy that residents used to protect the land claims of loved ones while frustrating others who felt the land could be put to better use.

Recounts are exciting and perilous times, requiring some to defensively reaffirm the images states have of them, while allowing others to remake that image in their favor. Luisa was among those who feared the count. She had a national land title, but due to the historical and political circumstances of her land claim, and her responsibilities to multiple spaces, her claim

among her neighbors was tenuous. When Luisa heard cadastral surveyors were making rounds she stayed in her house for three days scared she would miss them, or worse, that a neighbor would register the land under another name and contest her land claim.

For Claudia, however, counts were opportunities to present herself and her neighborhood in the best possible light. When I first met Claudia she was holding a crow bar and had just finished leading neighbors in knocking down one of the few brick houses in her neighborhood. The homeowner was livid. “They say they want development, but then they go around destroying houses!” Once the policeman mediating the conflict had left, Claudia and her neighbors approached me, metal tools in hand, and demanded to see my camera. They wanted to make certain I had not recorded the incident. For a moment, Claudia and her neighbors had resembled a violent, angry mob, rather than an organized and industrious community. This was not an image they wanted “the state” or anyone else to have of them. Once I proved my camera had been off, Claudia invited me for a cup of NesCafe and explained that what looked like a violent eviction was a necessary act conducted in the interest of community development. That same week, regional government representatives were registering houses, and district government surveyors were measuring lots. Their neighbor’s house extended over the street line and did not conform to the map district planners had recently redrawn. If “the district” saw the neighborhood that way it could delay plans to pave roads in their settlement.

As we sipped our coffee, a registrar arrived to inscribe Claudia and her four sisters into the regional property ledger. They gave him their names, told him where they lived on the block, and which lots belonged to their adult children. Together the family occupied seven lots. When the registrar commented that they were all related, Claudia explained “Yes, we’re all the same family, but we’re also individuals.” This is how Claudia appears in official documents and

registries, the pictures the state has of her. Two months after the district and regional governments had registered Claudia's house, her settlement received land titles. I rarely saw her after that.

One of the purported goals of recounts is to determine who “really” lives in Pachacútec; to find or create an ideal-type resident who will live with their nuclear family in a single house full-time, building their homes and communities from the ground up. Yet these recounts lead, not to stable living, but to punctuated living. People scramble to present themselves in particular ways when they know they are most likely to be seen by state officials. Rather than contain residency, recounts are layered into multivalent residency performances. Whether it is constructing an image of community solidarity at political rallies, participating in neighborhood development projects, or being individually inscribed on as many documents as possible, “doing living” in Pachacútec means being counted and recounted as someone who lives there.

### **Conclusion**

The 2007 census was accompanied by much fanfare. President García assured the population that his census would see every Peruvian and count them correctly. By the time census-takers arrived, people had assumed their positions. They answered doors donning the words *No Vive*, stood in front of esteras assembled the night before, or sat on the unfinished floors of houses they had purchased but never slept in. Luisa spent the evening in Pachacútec with her youngest daughter while her other children waited to be counted at her other home. Amélie volunteered as a census taker for the day, dutifully recording people where she found them while joking about their possible turista status. Claudia's house remained empty, as it had ever since she received her land title. Given her financial resources, community position, and political and documentary savvy, perhaps she felt she could skip this count.

Ethnographic evidence from Pachacútec suggests that numbers, and the intermittent forms of state surveillance embodied in recounts, inform squatters' actions in unexpected ways and play contradictory roles in constructing residency and land rights. Counts, which often begin as the populist machinations of constituent-seeking politicians, mediate relations between states and citizens, reproducing idealized imaginaries of both in the process. However, these encounters occur in spurts and jolts and people "do living" accordingly. They anticipate counts, incorporating them into their performances of residency and efforts to gain land rights. Although many recounts are justified based on the belief that land should go to ideal-type residents, in practice they disaggregate residency, allowing people to "do living" in divergent ways and potentially undermining efforts to construct the urbanized, middle-class, and socially integrated neighborhoods shantytown residents desire.

Although Pachacútec is following the trajectory of Lima's older shantytowns and slowly developing into a fully-serviced urbanization (see Anderson 2007), the different ways Pachacutanos "do living" continue to generate divergent experiences of community and intra-communal conflicts. For over-active residents like Silvia, collaborative residency performances produce intimate and official ties that she experiences as a "solidaristic community" (Auyero 2001), and which may succeed in obtaining infrastructural amenities, even if some families acquire extra properties in the process. For someone like Luisa, an owner and part-time resident excluded from dominant networks because of the timing of her land claim and her sporadic occupancy, neighbors and state agents are sources of anxiety and insecurity. There are people like Amélie, who desire a vibrant and cohesive shantytown community, but work diligently with members of their social network to produce a neighborhood they experience as empty. Finally, as the stories of Teodora and Claudia show, at the extremes, conflicts over inadequate residency

generate violence and perpetuate inequalities even as they create ownership opportunities for people who would not otherwise have them.

This analysis of residency, property, and community in Pachacútec has implications for how anthropologists understand geographies of citizenship and the dynamics of urbanization. In recent years, anthropologists have shown that citizenship is more than legal status; it is a “complex bundle of practices” that constitutes membership in different political communities, of which the nation-state is only one (Lazar 2013). In particular, scholars have examined place- and property-making as constitutive of political membership and described the city as both the site and object of these claims (ibid). However, the battles over residency in Pachacútec complicate this citizenship framework even further. They reveal that people may contribute to place-making in diverse ways that link them to space without binding them to it. Moreover, part of contributing to place-making is having your contributions recognized by different audiences, who may disagree about which contributions matter.

The diverse, knotted, and variegated inclusions that define Pachacútec conflict with conventional depictions of shantytowns as homogenous spaces of social exclusion. People have divergent claims to the same space based on different forms of occupancy and political recognition, and on the different temporalities of right and need embedded in shantytown property regimes. In shantytowns, land claims may be based on: past contributions to development, making property a product of labor and legal recognition; active use and contributions to everyday community life; anticipation of future need and socially recognized obligations to care for family; and beliefs about individual entitlements to security and autonomy. As anxieties about unsustainable urban growth in the Global South meet debates about speculation and accumulation in the Global North, anthropologists should attend to the

multiple ways people use and lay claim to space in the city and the conflicts that result. Not only will this help us make sense of cities that are simultaneously sprawling, soaring, and pockmarked; it will also tell us something about the values that unite communities, indicate where the balance of power lies in a given society, and reveal socio-moral fault lines that might divine future change.

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<sup>i</sup> Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática

<sup>ii</sup>In 1981 and 1993 Peru took *de facto* censuses, counting physical bodies where they stood. The 2005 census, however, used methods similar to the United States. It was taken over 32 days and asked residents to report who belonged in each household. Had Garcia not nullified the results, it would have been supplemented by comprehensive household sample surveys.

<sup>iii</sup> Ananya Roy (2004) describes homogenizing, morally simplistic renderings of shantytowns as part of an “aestheticization of poverty” that impedes rigorous scholarship and legitimizes strictly aesthetic or legalistic solutions to poverty (such as land titling) that treat “inclusion” as a matter of singular, one-dimensional recognition, rather than an ongoing, multifaceted negotiation.

<sup>iv</sup> “Neopopulism” describes the use of highly personalistic, anti-oligarchic political rhetoric amid fiscal austerity and privatization. Fujimori, for instance, gained broad support by financing inexpensive, community based projects that could be directly attributed to him.

<sup>v</sup> “Extreme Poverty” is a term used officially and colloquially to describe Peru’s lowest socio-economic sector. Although precise definitions vary by organization, national socio-economic maps describe “extreme poverty zones” as political jurisdictions where inhabitants lack more than 3 of 5 essential services: water and sewage infrastructure, electricity, hospitals, primary schools, and land titles.

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<sup>vi</sup> Peru spends 8% of GDP on social programs, which is less than half the Latin American average (Levitsky 2014).

<sup>vii</sup> Legally, “land trafficking” means selling land that does not belong to you. However, ambiguous land laws make this a common occurrence. Colloquially, the “land trafficker” label is therefore reserved for people who facilitate morally-contested land transfers that do not result in fully-serviced urban neighborhoods.

<sup>viii</sup> This law, Civil Code Article 920, was modified by Article 67 of Law 30230 in 2014.

<sup>ix</sup> This step often precedes the invasion, when politicians informally indicate that land can be made available to squatters in exchange for political support.

<sup>x</sup> Alan Garcia was president from 1985-1990, overseeing economic crisis and a dramatic rise in political violence. He fled to Paris following corruption charges in 1992, but was re-elected in 2006.

<sup>xi</sup> These statistics are derived from the results of Peru’s 2007 census for Pachacútec’s encompassing district of Ventanilla. Given Ventanilla’s spatial development, it is reasonable to assume most “recent migrants” (i.e. people who resided elsewhere 5 years before the census ) live in Pachacútec. Expanding this definition to include the 2000 relocation would likely increase the total number of “recent migrants” and the proportion from Lima-Callao substantially.

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